REVISIONIST THEORY AND HISTORY
OF MONEY
Unemployment: Human Sacrifice on the Altar
of Mammon
by Antal E. Fekete
October 1, 2005
Abstract
The Great Depression of the 1930's bringing unprecedented world-wide
unemployment in its wake was not caused by the "contractionist nature" of
the gold standard as alleged by John M. Keynes. Nor was it caused
by "fractional reserve banking" as alleged by Murray N. Rothbard.
It was caused by national governments sabotaging the clearing system
of the international gold standard, the bill market, thereby destroying
the wage fund of workers employed in the production and distribution
of consumer goods. In throwing out the bath-water of real bills governments
have thrown out the baby of full employment. Unemployment is the
modern version of the earlier religious practice of making human
sacrifice on the altar of Mammon.
The tale of the cuckoo's egg
1909 was a milestone in the history of money. That year, in preparation
for the coming war, the note issues of the Bank of France and of
the Reichsbank of Germany were made legal tender. Most people did
not even notice the subtle change. Gold coins stayed in circulation
for another five years. It was not the disappearance of gold coins
from circulation that heralded the destruction of the world's monetary
and payments system. There was an early warning: the German and French
government's decision to make bank notes legal tender that would
effectively sabotage the clearing system of the international gold
standard, the bill market.
Real bills drawn on consumer goods in urgent demand circulated world-wide
without let or hindrance before 1909. As goods were moving to the
ultimate gold-paying consumer, bills drawn on them matured, as it
were, into gold coins, that is to say, into a present good. It is
readily seen that the notion of a bill maturing into a legal tender
bank note is preposterous. The bank note is not a present good but,
like the bill itself, a future good. Furthermore, legal tender means
coercion enforced within a given jurisdiction but unenforceable outside.
At any rate, legal tender bank notes were incompatible with the voluntary
system based on the bill of exchange payable in gold coin at maturity.
They were bound to paralyze the market in real bills. The monkey
wrench has been thrown into the clearing system of the international
gold standard.
The bank of issue continued to use the bill of exchange as an earning
asset to back the legal tender bank note issue. But other subtle
changes would alter the character of the world's monetary system
beyond recognition. The cuckoo has invaded the neighboring nest to
lay her egg surreptitiously. In addition to bank notes originating
in bills of exchange bank notes originating in financial bills have
made their appearance for the first time. In due course the cuckoo
chick would hatch and push the native chick out of the nest. In five
years the entire portfolio of the bank of issue consisting of real
bills exclusively would be replaced by one consisting of financial
bills, including treasury bills. The real bill has become an endangered
species. In another five years it would become extinct.
Bank notes as self-liquidating credit
Previous to 1909 circulating capital for the production of consumer
goods in urgent demand had been financed, not out of savings, but
through discounting real bills at a commercial bank which would then
rediscount them at the bank of issue that supplied the country with
bank notes. To be sure, these bank notes represented self-liquidating
credit. They were merely a more convenient form of the bill of exchange
from which they derived their strength. They came in standard denomination
round figures. Unlike the bill of exchange they could without hassle
and loss be broken up into smaller units. The great convenience they
offered was valued by the public so much that people were willing
to pay for it in the form of forgone discount.
When the bill matured and was paid, the bank note was retired. For
this very reason it was not inflationary, not any more than the real
bill itself. The bank of issue would under no circumstances prolong
credit beyond the maturity date of the rediscounted bill. If the
underlying merchandise could not be sold in 91 days then, for the
stronger reason, it would not be sold in 365 days, certainly not
before the same season of the year came around once more. But by
that time the merchandise would be stale and could only be sold at
a loss. Prolonging credit on a mature bill would violate the letter
and spirit of the law governing central banking in Germany prior
to 1909.
Could a commercial bank, nevertheless, roll over a real bill at
maturity? On strictly economic grounds it wouldn't. First of all,
it would forfeit its rediscounting privileges at the bank of issue
if it did. Secondly, it would make its portfolio less liquid and
so it could no longer compete successfully with more liquid banks.
Having said this, we must admit that in practice some banks may have
been guilty of rolling over mature real bills for various reasons.
At the benign end of the spectrum the reason could be a false sense
of loyalty to clients; at the malignant, conspiracy with them in
speculative ventures. It was this latter practice that could be properly
condemned as "credit expansion". However, the unethical behavior
of some banks should be no grounds for issuing a blanket condemnation
of all banks and calling the legitimate practice of discounting real
bills "credit expansion" with a disapproving connotation.
Real bills versus financial bills
The changeover from bank notes backed by real bills to bank notes
backed by financial bills was the last nail in the coffin of the
clearing system of the international gold standard. Monetary scientists
and others with intellectual power to grasp the intricacies of bank
note circulation raised their voice condemning the new paradigm making
financial bills eligible for rediscount, a practice that had previously
been prohibited by law with severe penalties for non-compliance.
Most people could not understand what the fuss was about. But there
was a world of a difference between rediscounting real bills as opposed
to financial bills. It was the difference between self-liquidating
credit and non-self-liquidating credit. Real bills were backed by
a huge international bill market with its practically inexhaustible
demand for liquid earning assets. Financial bills were backed by
the odds that speculative inventory of goods and equities or investment
in brick and mortar may be unwound without a loss. If the odds did
not play out in time, then at maturity the financial bills would
have to be rolled over. This was borrowing short and lending long
through the back door, carrier of the seeds of self-destruction.
The chimera of "fractional reserve banking"
Financial bills made the asset portfolio of the bank of issue illiquid.
The bank could no longer satisfy potential demand for gold coins,
should holders of bank notes decide to exercise their legal right
to redeem them. To take away this right was the reason for making
bank notes legal tender in the first place. Redemption wouldn't be
a problem as long as the asset portfolio consisted of real bills
exclusively. Every single day one-ninetieth of the outstanding bank
notes matured into gold coins which were available for redemption.
This would normally suffice to satisfy daily demand. But what about
abnormal demand for gold coins?
A real bill is the most liquid earning asset in existence. At any
time somewhere in the world there is demand for it. In particular,
banks that have a temporary overflow of gold would be more than anxious
to exchange it for real bills. The bank of issue would not have the
slightest difficulty to get gold in exchange for real bills in the
international bill market. Once upon a time the Bank of England boasted
that "it could draw gold from the moon by raising the rediscount
rate to 5%." The assumption that there will always be takers for
real bills offered is just as safe as the assumption that people
will want to eat, get clad, keep themselves warm and sheltered tomorrow
and every day thereafter.
This explodes the blanket condemnation of "fractional reserve banking",
a stand so popular nowadays in some circles. Detractors of fractional
reserve banking are barking up the wrong tree. They should condemn
the practice of rediscounting financial bills on the same terms as
real bills. The latter were self-liquidating, while the former had
impaired liquidity: under certain circumstances they might become
unsaleable even in peacetime. They were simply unsuitable to serve
as bank reserves.
Prior to 1909 the charter of every bank of issue explicitly made
financial bills ineligible for rediscounting. The laws governing
central banking prohibited the use of these bills for the purposes
of backing the note issue, and prescribed heavy penalties for non-compliance.
This was not a controversial issue. Informed people could distinguish
between safe banking that utilized real bills and unsafe banking
that utilized financial bills to back the note issue. That judgment
is epitomized by the old saying that "the easiest profession in the
world is that of the banker, provided that he can tell a bill and
a mortgage apart".
Reflux
The process of retiring the bank note after the merchandise serving
as the basis for its issue has been removed from the market by the
ultimate gold-paying consumer is called "reflux". Some authors ridiculed
the concept calling it a deus ex machina. They argued that
the banks were only interested in credit expansion, not in reflux.
They would not for one moment think of withdrawing a corresponding
amount of bank notes from circulation when the real bill matured.
Instead, they would lend them out at interest to enrich themselves
at the expense of the public. For the stronger reason, you could
also ridicule the entire legal system asking the rhetorical question: "what
is the point in making laws when they will be broken anyhow?" This
is not a valid argument. You can't judge the merit of an institution
by the behavior of those who are set upon destroying it.
Let us follow the trail of gold coins through the path of reflux.
Our description is necessarily schematic. For the sake of simplicity
we assume that only distributor-on-retailer bills are discounted.
This is reasonable as these bills are more liquid than producer-on-distributor
bills, or higher-order-producer-on-lower-order-producer bills. We
also assume that the retailer is expected to pay his bill with gold
coins flowing to him from the consumers. The gold is considered proof
that the merchandise underlying the bill has been sold to the ultimate
consumer and is not held, contrary to the purpose of bill circulation,
in speculative stores in anticipation of a price rise. Finally, our
description follows the practice of the German banking system as
it was before 1909. The practice elsewhere may have been different,
but the essential idea was the same: with the sale of merchandise
the gold coin was recycled from the consumer through the retail merchant
to the commercial bank, from where it would be withdrawn by producers
in order to pay wages, thus putting the gold coin back into the hand
of the consumers. Then the cycle of supplying the consumer with urgently
demanded merchandise could start all over again.
In more details, as gold coins flowed from the consumer to the retail
merchant, they were deposited at the commercial bank. When he was
ready to replenish his depleted inventory, the retailer ordered a
fresh supply and, after endorsing the bill he returned it to the
distributor. The latter would discount it at the commercial bank
taking the proceeds in the form of bank notes which the commercial
bank obtained from the bank of issue through rediscounting.
The distributor would use the bank notes to pay the producer of
first order goods for supplies. The latter would use them to pay
the producer of second order goods for supplies, and so on. But when
it came to paying wages, all these producers had to draw out gold
coins from the commercial bank against bank notes. Upon maturity
the commercial bank paid the rediscounted bill with bank notes which
the bank of issue was under obligation to retire. It could not lend
them out at interest. If it did, it would violate the law, and would
have to pay heavy penalties. The only purpose the retired bank notes
could be used for was to rediscount fresh bills drawn on new consumer
goods moving to the ultimate gold-paying consumer. This was not the
same as lending them out at interest, since lending and discounting
were two entirely different banking functions.
Now the gold coin was in the hands of the wage-earner. As he spent
it in buying consumer goods he enabled the retail merchant to make
payments on his discounted bill at the commercial bank with gold.
When paid in full, it was returned to the retail merchant and the
bill's ephemeral life as a means of payment has come to an end. But
the march of gold coins would continue. They would be withdrawn by
the producers to pay wages, and the cycle of supplying wage-earners
with consumer goods against payment in gold coin could start all
over again.
Mistaking the back-seat driver for the boss in
the driver seat
The havoc that the silent monetary revolution of 1909 would wreak
upon society had not been foreseen. Nor was the causal relation between
the expulsion of real bills and massive unemployment recognized in
retrospect after the worst happened and almost 50% of trade union
members, or 8 million people, lost their jobs in Germany alone.
Real bills finance the movement of consumer goods, including wages
paid to people handling the maturing merchandise through the various
stages of production and distribution. The size of circulating capital
needed to move the mass of consumer goods through these stages, if
financed out of savings, would be staggering. Quite simply, it could
not be done. No conceivable economy would produce savings so generously
as to be able to finance all circulating capital that society needed
in order to flourish at present levels of comfort and security. To
move a $100 item all the way to the consumer may, in an extreme case,
require savings in the order of $5000, or 50 times retail value!
Fortunately, there is no need to employ savings in such a wasteful
manner. It is true that fixed capital must be financed out of savings.
As a result, creation of fixed capital depends on the propensity
to save. Not so circulating capital, provided that the merchandise
moves fast enough to the ultimate gold-paying consumer. It can be
financed through self-liquidating credit which depends on the propensity
to consume, but is independent from the propensity to save.
The discovery of this fact is one of the great achievements of the
human spirit and intellect, on a par with the discovery of indirect
exchange. The impact on human life of the invention of the circulating
bill of exchange is fully commensurate with that of the invention
of the wheel. The detractors of the Real Bills Doctrine have missed
one of the most exciting developments of our civilization: the discovery
of self-liquidating credit in the wake of the disappearance of risks
in the production process as the maturing good gets within earshot
of the final gold-paying consumer.
Pari passu with the emergence of the need for consumer goods
the means to finance their production and distribution emerges as
well. It is in the form of the bill of exchange. Retailers and distributors
hardly ever pay cash for supplies of consumer goods. "91 days net" is
invariably part of the deal, to give ample time for the merchandise
to reach the ultimate gold-paying consumer. Producers of higher-order
goods could fold tent and go out of business if they insisted on
cash payment for the supplies they provide. Producers of lower-order
goods were the boss by virtue of being that much closer to the ultimate
consumer and his gold coin. They would laugh you out of court if
you told them that they have just been granted a loan and the discount
is just interest taken out of the proceeds in advance. They know
better. They know that self-liquidating credit is theirs for the
taking. They know that the discount rate has nothing to do with the
rate of interest. For a consideration they may be willing to prepay
their bill before maturity. The privilege is theirs. The discount
is just the consideration to tempt them. Those who insist that the
producer of the higher-order good is the lender and that of the lower-order
good is the borrower are mistaking the back-seat driver for the boss
in the driver seat.
The biggest job-destruction ever
Let us now see how the governments destroyed the wage fund of workers
employed in the sector providing goods and services to the consumer.
These workers'wages were financed through the trade in real bills.
The emerging consumer good they handled would not be sold to the
ultimate consumer for 91 days at the latest. Yet in the meantime
these workers had to eat, get clad, keep themselves warm and sheltered.
If they could, it was only because real bills trading would keep
replenishing their wage fund.
In order to create a job capital must be accumulated through savings.
This applies to the fixed capital deployed in making both producer
goods and consumer goods. In case of the former it applies to circulating
capital as well. But if circulating capital had to be accumulated
through savings in the latter case, too, then jobs in the consumer
goods sector would be few and far in between. In the event jobs were
plentiful in that sector because of the fact that circulating capital
supporting them could be financed through self-liquidating credit
that did not tie up savings. By contrast, jobs in the producers good
sector could not be financed in this way, explaining why they were
not nearly as plentiful nor as easily available.
When governments locked out real bills from the payments system,
they inadvertently destroyed the wage fund of workers employed in
the sector providing goods and services for the consumer. Unless
they were prepared to assume responsibility for paying wages, there
would be unemployment on a massive scale that would spill over to
all other sectors as well. Eventually the governments, to avoid undermining
social peace, decided to do just that. They invented the so-called "welfare
state" paying so-called "unemployment insurance" to people who could
have easily found employment had the clearing system of the gold
standard, the bill market, been allowed to make a come-back after
World War I. What has been hailed as a heroic job-creation program
appears, in the present light, as a miserable effort at damage control
by the same government that has destroyed those jobs in the first
place. Economists share responsibility for the disaster. They have
never examined the 1909 decision to make bank notes legal tender
from the point of view of its effect on employment. They should have
demanded that, instead of treating the symptoms, the government remove
the cause in reinstating the international gold standard and its
clearing system, the bill market. They should have demanded that
the government abolish the legal tender privilege of bank notes forthwith.
It took 20 years for the chickens of 1909 to come home to roost.
But come home they did with a vengeance. However, by 1929 the memory
of the 1909 coercive manipulation of bank notes faded, and virtually
no one realized that a causal relationship existed between the two
events: making bank notes legal tender and the wholesale destruction
of jobs twenty years later.
The father of revisionist theory and history of
money
One man who did, and whom we salute as the father of revisionist
theory and history of money, was Professor Heinrich Rittershausen
of Germany. In his 1930 book Arbeitslosigkeit und Kapitalbildung (Unemployment
and Capital Formation) he predicted not only the imminent collapse
of the gold standard but also the wholesale destruction of jobs world-wide
as a result of the explosion of the time bomb planted in 1909, wrecking
the clearing system of the international gold standard, the bill
market. The horrible unemployment Rittershausen predicted would continue
to haunt the world for the rest of the 20 th century and beyond.
If we want to exorcise the world of the incubus of unemployment
with which it has been saddled by greedy governments making bank
notes legal tender in their worship of Mammon, not only must we
return to the international gold standard, but we must also rehabilitate
its clearing system, the bill market. In this way the fund, out
of which wages to all those eager to earn them for work in providing
the consumer with goods and services can be paid, will be resurrected.
Then, and only then, can the so-called welfare state paying workers
for not working and farmers for not farming be dismantled.
References
Heinrich Rittershausen, Arbeitslosigkeit und Kapitalbildung,
Jena: Fischer, 1930. A Spanish translation of this volume including
an essay of von Beckerath was published in Barcelona in 1934.
Heinrich Rittershausen, Zahlungsverkehr, Einkaufsscheine
und Arbeitsbeschaffung, published in the Annalen der Gemeinwirtschaft,
vol. 10, p 153-207, Jan.-July, 1934. This paper is also available
in English translation (by G. Spiller) under the title Unemployment
as a Problem of Turnover Credits and the Supply of Means of Payment,
in the volume: Ending the Unemployment and Trade Crisis,
p 137-187, London: William and Northgate, 1935. See the website: http://www.reinventingmoney.com.
A French translation (apparently of a better quality) under the
title Organisation des echange et creation de travail can
be found in the volume Le chomage, probleme de credit commercial
et d'approvisionnement en moyens de paiement, p 154-214, Paris:
Recueil Sirey, 1934.
Antal E. Fekete, Adam Smith's Real Bills Doctrine,
Monetary Economics 101, Gold Standard University, 2002, see the website: http://www.goldisfreedom.com.
Antal E. Fekete, Detractors of Adam Smith's Real
Bills Doctrine, July 2005, see the website: http://www.safehaven.com/.
Acknowledgement
The author is grateful to Dr. Theo Megalli of Plattling,
Germany, for bringing the work of Heinrich Rittershausen to his attention.
The biography of H. Rittershausen (1898-1984) by Dr. Megalli can
be found on the website: http://www.reinventingmoney.com/rittershausenBiography.php/.
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Antal E. Fekete is Professor Emeritus at Memorial University
in St. Johns, Newfoundland. Born and educated in Hungary, he emigrated
to Canada after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and taught for 35
years in the field of mathematics. Over the years, he has been a
visiting professor or Fellow at Columbia University, Princeton University,
and Trinity College of Dublin. He worked in the Washington office
of Congressman W.E. Dannemeyer on monetary and fiscal reform for
five years in the nineties; and in 1996, he won first prize in the
prestigious International Currency Essay contest sponsored by Bank
Lips Ltd. of Switzerland. He is the author of Gold and Interest and Monetary
Economics 101. In addition, his scholarly articles have appeared
on numerous Internet sites such as Financial Sense Online, Free-Market
News, Gold-Eagle, SafeHaven, and LeMetropoleCafe.
E-mail: aefekete@hotmail.com